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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently-decided labor and employment law cases have given
employees in the United States little reason to cheer. With the National
Labor Relations Board potentially denying collective bargaining rights to
large groups of private sector employees in its recent Kentucky River
supervisor trilogy rulings,1 and with public employees seeing First
Amendment protections substantially diminished in so-called “officialcapacity” speech cases in light of the United State Supreme Court’s
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the lone bright spot for employees has
been the robust interpretation given by the Supreme Court to anti-retaliation
provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railroad v. White.4
With all of these highly important cases being decided during the past
year, employment law commentators have paid little attention to the
Solomon Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. FAIR5 and its discussion of the
right to expressive association under the First Amendment.6 This is hardly
1

See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37 (Sept. 29, 2006)
(finding certain charge nurses in acute-care hospital fell within the
definition of “supervisor” set forth in Section 2(11) of the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”)); Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 NLRB No.
39 (Sept. 29, 2006) (concluding charge nurses at nursing home were not
supervisors for purposes of the NLRA); and Croft Metals, Inc., 348 NLRB
No. 38 (Sept. 29, 2006) (holding lead persons working in manufacturing
facility were not supervisors under the Act). As problematic as these
decisions may become for the labor movement, at least some commentators
believe the decisions could have been worse for unions. See, e.g., Jeff
Hirsch, Board Decides “Kentucky River” Cases, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG,
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2006/10/
board_decides_k.html (October 3, 2006) (“My personal take on these cases
is that they're not great for unions, but they could have been worse.”).
2
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). For a more in-depth consideration of Ceballos
and its implications for public employee First Amendment rights, see infra
Part V.B.
3
42 U.S.C. § 2000e - §2000e-17 (2000).
4
126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (eschewing more stringent standard in
favor of one based on showing reasonable employee would have found
retaliatory action materially adverse).
5
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
6
See id. at 1311-13.
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surprising given the less than obvious employment law connections.
Nevertheless, there are some very real, if unintended, employment law
consequences stemming from this decision.
Since the constitutional right to association was first recognized in the
civil right cases of the 1950s and 1960s,7 there has never been a satisfactory
conception of what groups make up protected associations for First
Amendment purposes. This fact has been lamented by Professor Andrew
Morriss in his recent pre-FAIR piece8 as well as by others scholars.9
Together, they point out that past Supreme Court expressive association
cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees,10 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club on Duarte,11 and Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,12 really do not say
much, outside of their own examples, about how to determine who is and
who is not an expressive association.13
Not only did FAIR not help matters in this regard, but it made matters
worse by inadvertently finding that public employers, in the guise of public
law school members of the FAIR association,14 have expressive association
7

See infra Part III.A.
See Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom
of Association: Why the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional and Law
Schools Are Not Expressive Associations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
415, 444 (2005) (“The Supreme Court’s expressive association cases are …
of little direct guidance on the question of what constitutes an expressive
association largely because that issue has not yet arisen in a case before the
Court.”).
9
See, e..g., Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural:
Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483
(2001); Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639
(2002).
10
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
11
481 U.S. 537 (1987).
12
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
13
See Farber, supra note 9, at 1498 (“So far, the Court has given us a
series of examples without any defining principle.”); Mazzone, supra note
9, at 680 (“As the doctrine of freedom of association has developed the
examples are all the rules we have.”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 215
(2003) (“[O]ne looks in vain to Dale for some persuasive, principled, or
even predictable limit on the First Amendment protections enjoyed by
associations.”).
14
FAIR includes law schools as institutions and law school faculties,
but both are treated collectively as “law schools” under the Court’s analysis
8
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rights.15 Now, this point did not impact the decision in FAIR itself, because
even though such institutions were expressive associations, it was found
that the Solomon Amendment's requirement of equal access of military
recruiters on law school campuses did not unconstitutionally burden law
schools’ expressive association rights.16
Nevertheless, the future
consequences could be far reaching if public employers are considered to
have First Amendment rights to expressive association like the FAIR public
law schools. Specifically, this could mean that public employers would
gain constitutional rights at the expense of pubic employees' civil liberties
and civil rights.17
Thankfully, it is hard to imagine that the Court, if faced with the
question directly, would find that public employers have First Amendment
rights of any kind. This interpretation of the First Amendment is
structurally unsound from the standpoint that the Bill of Rights protects the
governed, not the governing.18 To the extent that public employers have
interests in promoting messages consistent with their public mission and
image, it is better to conceive of these interests as the same as those
discussed in the Pickering19 line of cases concerning the need for
governmental efficiency and lack of disruption in the public employment
sector when discussing public employee First Amendment rights.20
Moreover, in order to keep these governmental interest within reasonable
bounds, the government speech doctrine discussed in Ceballos should be
limited to those public employees who are specifically hired to promote the
government’s message and not too all employees who engage in conduct
pursuant to their job duties.21
The purpose of this paper then is to point out an inadvertent error that
the Court made in FAIR on its way to doing the heavy analytical lifting and
thus, permit this judicial misstep to be corrected before the finding of public
in FAIR. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1302, 1312-13; see also
infra note x. Of the known members of the association, four are public law
school faculties. See infra note x.
15
See infra Part II.C.; see also Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One
indication that the lower courts [in FAIR] paid insufficient attention to this
[expressive association] element is their failure to consider state law schools
as members of FAIR.").
16
See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
17
See infra Part IV.
18
See infra Part V.A.
19
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
20
See infra Part V.B.1.
21
See infra Part V.B.2.
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employer expressive associations causes substantial harm to public
employee civil liberties and civil rights in the workplace. The paper also
hopes to spur the Court in future cases to fashion a coherent constitutional
analysis in these cases by utilizing the Pickering doctrine and limiting the
application of the Ceballos government speech analysis.
This article discusses in five parts the Supreme Court's recognition of
public employer expressive associations in its Solomon Amendment
decision and how the Court should rectify this state of affairs, consistent
with the protection of public employee civil liberties and civil rights. Part II
explores in depth the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, with a focus on
the Court’s expressive association analysis. Part III then examines the
historically elusive meaning of what groups constitute expressive
associations under previous Supreme Court precedent and explains how this
lack of clarity could have contributed to its erroneous public employer
expressive association finding in FAIR. Next, Part IV outlines the
detrimental consequences to public employees caused by this unintended
constitutional development and provides examples to illustrate what
recognition of these public expressive associations would mean to both
public employees’ civil rights and civil liberties. Part V concludes by
arguing that the Court will eventually undo this mistake by relying on
structural arguments about the Bill of Rights, but urges the Court to use this
opportunity to fashion a workable framework for balancing public employer
efficiency interests against public employee constitutional rights by
utilizing the durable Pickering balancing test. At the same time, this paper
argues that the Court should modify its holding in Ceballos so that public
employee constitutional rights are not needlessly sacrificed through an
overblown application of the government speech doctrine.
II. RUMSFELD V. FAIR
A. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Solomon Amendment
The recently-decided First Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR),22 also colloquially referred to as
the Solomon Amendment case, stems from the very first days of the Clinton
Administration in the early 1990s when a legislative compromise was
struck concerning the inclusion of homosexual individuals within the
American military services.23 Whereas previously the military had more
22

126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
See Morriss, supra note 8, at 434 (discussing the history surrounding
the military's DADT policy) (citing Eugene R. Milhizer, "Don't Ask, Don't
23
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actively sought to exclude homosexual members from the military,24 the
new “don’t ask, don’t tell” (DADT) policy shielded homosexuals from
being dismissed from military service as long as they did not engage in
homosexual acts, state that they were homosexuals, or marry a person of the
same sex.25 Not surprisingly, most homosexuals and their supporters were
unhappy with this compromise and continue to this day to fight to allow
openly-gay individuals into military service.26 Nevertheless, the DADT
policy remains in effect as of the writing of this article in early 2007 and has
been found to be constitutional by several federal appellate courts.27
In solidarity with opponents of the DADT policy and consistent with
their own non-discrimination policies which, among things, prohibits
recruiters from engaging in sexual orientation discrimination,28 a number of
law schools began restricting access to their campuses by military
recruiters.29 In response to these schools placing obstacles in the way of
military recruiters, Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment which
prevents colleges and universities from receiving certain federal funding30 if
Tell": A Qualified Defense, 21 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 349, 351-66
(2004)).
24
See id.
25
10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) (West 1998).
26
For instance, the Service Members Legal Defense Network is
currently mounting a campaign to persuade Congress to repeal the DADT
policy and allow homosexuals to serve openly in the armed services. See
Service Member Legal Defense Network Take Action Lobby Day 2007,
http://ga1.org/sldn/events/lobbyday07/details.tcl (last visited January 7,
2007) (setting out information for group lobbying effort in March 2007 in
Washington D.C. to repeal DADT).
27
See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v.
Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997). The policy
continues to be challenged on constitutional grounds, but without success.
See Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006) (dismissing
challenge to DADT policy on Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a
claim).
28
As of 1990, the Association of American Law Schools requires
member schools to adopt nondiscrimination policies on the basis of sexual
orientation. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 6, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004)
(No. 03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)).
29
See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1302 (2006).
30
Although student financial assistance is not covered by the law,
federal funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
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they prohibit military recruiters "from gaining access to campuses, or access
to students . . . on campuses, for purpose of military recruiting in a manner
that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to
students that is provided to any other employer."31
Many law schools believed that the Solomon Amendment required them
to choose between abandoning their nondiscrimination policies or lose a
substantial amount of federal funding.32 A group of public and private law
schools and faculties, called the Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc. (FAIR),33 sued for entry of a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, arguing that the law
impermissibly infringed on law schools' First Amendment rights of speech
and association.34

Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, among
other agencies, may be lost at the university-wide level if schools do not
comply with the Solomon Amendment. See 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1), (2).
31
Id. § 983(b) (Supp. 2005). In its first iteration, the Solomon
Amendment withdrew federal funds from higher education institutions that
prevented military recruiters "from gaining entry to campuses." However,
the Department of Defense later adopted an informal policy that "entry to
campus" meant that universities had to provide military recruiters access to
their students equal in quality and scope as that provided to other recruiters.
See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 283 (D.N.J. 2003). This equal
access requirement was formally codified by Congress into the Solomon
Amendment in 2004 as a result of litigation of this matter in the district
court. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911-12
(2004).
32
See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1303.
33
The declared mission of FAIR is "to promote academic freedom,
support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate
the rights of institutions of higher education." See id. at 1302. According to
SolomonResponse.Org, FAIR consists of 36 participating law schools,
including 24 faculties and 12 institutions. See FAIR Participating Law
Schools, SOLOMONRESPONSE.ORG, at http://www.law.georgetown.edu
/solomon/participating_schools.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). Of these,
only 24 are publicly known, as the remaining members have chosen to
remain anonymous for fear of retaliation from the government and private
actors for their stance on this issue. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
34
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1302.
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B. Rumsfeld v. FAIR
After the district court found in favor of the government35 and then the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in a divided opinion and found in
favor of FAIR,36 the United States Supreme Court unanimously37 found that
the Solomon Amendment did not infringe FAIR's freedoms of speech and
association under the First Amendment. The Court's opinion can be divided
into two parts: statutory and constitutional.
1. The Statutory Argument
In the first section, the Court considered whether the case could be
disposed on statutory grounds as proposed by a brief filed by a number of
law professor amici.38 These professors believed that the equal access
requirement of the Solomon Amendment could be read to allow law schools
to apply a general nondiscrimination policy to exclude military recruiters.
In other words, as long as law schools excluded other recruiters that
violated their nondiscrimination policies, it could treat military recruiters in
the same fashion.39 The Court made short-shrift of this argument.
As an initial matter, both the government and FAIR did not believe this
to be the meaning of the equal access requirement of the Solomon
Amendment. Both read the statue to say that in order for a law school and
its university to receive federal funding, the same access must be afforded
to campus and students by military recruiters as that received by other nonmilitary recruiters.40 The Court agreed with the Government and FAIR,
finding that the proper focus of the statute was not on the content of a
school's recruiting policy, but instead on the result achieved by the policy.41
At the end of the day, the Court observed, the Solomon Amendment
requires that military recruiters must be given the same level of access to
law schools as other recruiters who comply with the law schools'

35

See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003).
See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
37
Justice Alito did not participate in the decision, so FAIR was actually
an 8-0 decision. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1302.
38
See id. at 1304-05 (citing Brief for William Alford et al. as Amici
Curiae 10-18; Brief for 56 Columbia Law School Faculty Members as
Amici Curiae 6-15).
39
Id. at 1305.
40
Id. at 1304.
41
Id. at 1305
36
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nondiscrimination policies.42
2. The Constitutional Arguments
Having rejected the statutory argument, the Court next considered
whether the First Amendment prevented the government from imposing the
Solomon Amendment access requirements on law schools. The Court
began with the proposition that Congress has great latitude in enacting
legislation to raise and support armies43 and requiring campus access for
military recruiters falls under that power unless Congress exceeds other
constitutional limitations, such as those imposed by the First Amendment.44
Nevertheless, even though the power to raise and support armies is subject
to First Amendment constraints, more deference has been historically given
to Congress when it enacts military-related legislation.45
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in finding for FAIR, had concluded
that the conditions placed on university federal funding by the Solomon
Amendment amounted to an impermissible unconstitutional condition and
therefore, exceeded the constitutional limitations placed on Congress’
power to raise and support armies.46 Under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, "the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected … freedom of speech even if he

42

Id. ("Applying the same policy to all recruiters is therefore
insufficient to comply with the statute if it results in a greater level of access
for other recruiters than for the military."). The Court also pointed out that
the recent amendments to the Solomon Amendment would make little sense
if the amici professors interpretation of the statute were adopted. See id. at
1305-06 ("Under amici's interpretation, this legislative change had no effect
-- law schools could still restrict military access, so long as they do so under
a generally applicable nondiscrimination policy . . . . That is rather clearly
not what Congress had in mind in codifying the DOD policy.") (emphasis in
original).
43
Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defence," "[t]o
raise and support Armies," and "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," under
Article I of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-13.
44
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
45
Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) ("[J]udicial
deference … is at its apogee" when Congress legislates under its authority
to raise and support armies)).
46
See id. at 1304 (citing FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 229-243 (3d
Cir. 2004)).
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has no entitlement to that benefit."47 The law schools argued that the
Solomon Amendment placed an unconstitutional condition on them because
it forced them to choose between forfeiting their First Amendment rights
and losing federal funding for their schools.48 The Court observed,
however, that a funding condition is not unconstitutional if it could be
constitutionally imposed directly,49 and therefore considered next whether
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement would
violate the law schools' First Amendment rights to free speech or
association.
a.

Free Speech Arguments

The Court first explored three different constitutional free speech
arguments made by FAIR.50 FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment
compelled them to speak the Government's message, required them to host
or accommodate the military's speech, and unconstitutionally infringed on
their right to engage in expressive conduct.51 The Court rejected all three of
these arguments, finding generally that the Solomon Amendment did not
require the FAIR schools to say or do anything.52 More specifically, the
Court found that there was not a government-mandated pledge or motto that

47

Id. at 1307 (citing United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539
U.S. 194, 210 (2003)).
48
Id. at 1304.
49
Id. at 1307 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
50
Because the free speech contentions in FAIR are not central to the
argument in this paper, it is enough to provide a cursory overview of these
arguments and their resolution by the Court. The Court also cursorily
rejected a fourth argument adopted by the Third Circuit that the Solomon
Amendment violated the First Amendment because it compelled the law
schools to subsidize government speech. See id. at 1307 n.4. In Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005), however, the Court
made clear that citizens no longer have a First Amendment right not to fund
government speech and thus, it found no basis for a First Amendment
challenge on these grounds.
This article returns later to this government speech doctrine in the public
employment context in discussing how employee First Amendment
constitutional rights and public employer efficiency interests should be
balanced. See infra Part V.B.2.
51
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307.
52
Id.
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the law schools had to endorse as in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette53
or Wooley v. Maynard,54 there was no requirement that the law schools
accommodate a government message that interfered with the law school's
desired message as in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc.,55 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Cal.,56 or Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,57 and there was no
conduct that amounted to expressive conduct as in United States v.
O'Brien58 or Texas v. Johnson.59
b.

Associational Arguments

Having determined that the Solomon Amendment did not violate the
law schools' freedom of speech, the Court next turned to whether the law
53

319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional state law that
required school children to recite the pledge of allegiance in school).
54
430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding unconstitutional state law that
required New Hampshire motorists to place on their automobiles' license
plates the state motto "Live Free or Die").
55
515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding unconstitutional state law
requiring parade to include group with message was antithetical to those of
the parade organizers). With regard to Hurley, the Court concluded that
unlike the decision surrounding who participates in a parade, allowing
military recruiters on law school campuses is not inherently expressive, and
does not sufficiently interfere with any message the law school wishes to
send. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1309-10.
56
475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional
law that allows state utility commission to place third-party newsletter in
electric company billing envelopes).
57
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitutional right-of-reply
state statute that violated newspaper's right to determine content of their
publication).
58
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that burning of draft card
expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection).
59
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that burning American flag
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment). Even if the O'Brien
test was appropriately applicable to the expressive conduct in FAIR, the
Court concluded in the alternative that the Solomon Amendment was a
neutral regulation that promoted a substantial governmental interest (i.e.,
raising and supporting armies) that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1311 (citing United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
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violated the schools' rights to expressive association as outlined in the case
of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.60 Although neither the right to
expressive association, nor any other type of "association," is found within
the text of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,61 such a
right has nevertheless been implicitly found in the Constitution by the
Court.62 This is because the ability to associate with others increases one's
ability to engage in expression protected by the Constitution.63 In this
regard, the Supreme Court has commented that an "individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for the redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the state
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends
60

530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding New Jersey public accommodation
statute unconstitutional because it violated the Boy Scouts’ expressive
association rights by requiring them to accept a homosexual assistant
scoutmaster as a member).
61
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
62
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)
("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
other in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends."); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (labeling such rights as an
indispensable part liberty on the same plane as the rights to speech, press, or
association).
63
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. Professor Chemerinksy explains more
practically that because groups have resources in human capital and money,
such groups enhance an individual's freedom to engage in protected
constitutional activities. See Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1113 (2d ed. 2002); see also New York State
Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) ("The ability and
opportunity to combine with others to advance one's view is a powerful
practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First
Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government.");
Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (2001) ("[The
First Amendment's] chief value may be the role it plays in protecting people
who want to combine with others to promote common causes.").
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were not also guaranteed."64 FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment
violated the law schools' rights to expressive association by inhibiting their
ability to express their message that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is wrong by forcing them to have military recruiters on their
campuses.65
As outlined in Dale and other expressive association cases, such claims
require that three elements be established: (1) the group is an expressive
association; (2) forced inclusion of outsiders would significantly affect the
group's expression, and (3) the government's interests do not justify this
intrusion.66 In FAIR, the Court spent much time on the second and third
elements on the law schools' expressive association claim, but very little on
the first.
Finding without analysis that FAIR was an expressive association,67 the
Court concluded that the Solomon Amendment did not significantly burden
the law schools' associational rights and thus, did not need to waste ink on
justifying the government's intrusion on those rights.68 More specifically,
the Court concluded that although law schools associate to some extent with
military recruiters in that they interact with them, these same recruiters do
not come to campus seeking to become members of the schools' expressive
association.69 Moreover, even though the right to expressive association
protects more than just membership decisions, the Solomon Amendment
also does not make group membership in the law schools less attractive, as
law school students and faculty are free to voice their disapproval of the
military's DADT policy while the recruiters are on campus.70
Having come to this determination on FAIR’s expressive association
64

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312
(2006) ("If the government were free to restrict individuals' ability to join
together and speak, it could essentially silence the views that the First
Amendment is intended to protect.").
65
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312.
66
Id. (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-59).
67
The missing part of the FAIR Court’s expressive association analysis
is discussed in detail infra Part II.C.
68
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312.
69
Id. In other words, there is no expressive association violation
because "the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school 'to accept
members it does not desire.'" Id. (quoting in part Dale, 530 U.S. at 648;
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
70
Id. at 1312-13 ("A military recruiter's mere presence on campus does
not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the
law school considers the recruiter's message.").
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claims, the court concluded that the Solomon Amendment neither violated
the FAIR law schools' free speech nor association rights, finding instead
that FAIR "had attempted to stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines
well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect."71
C. The Missing Expressive Association Analysis
But the Court is the one who seems to have unwittingly "stretched" one
First Amendment doctrine too far by not taking the time to analyze whether
all members of FAIR, including its state law school members, should have
expressive association rights.72 With regard to whether FAIR is an
expressive association, all the Court stated in this regard is the following:
•

"The Solomon Amendment, however, does not similarly affect a
law school's associational rights."73

•

"Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus
for the limited purpose of trying to hire students -- not to
become members of the school's expressive association."74

•

"The Solomon Amendment has no similar effect on a law
school's associational rights."75

•

"The Solomon Amendment therefore does not violate a law
school's First Amendment rights. A military recruiter's mere
presence on campus does not violate a law school's right to
associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers
the recruiter's message."76

Note that in all of these passages from the opinion the Court is not assuming
for the sake of argument that FAIR is an expressive association, it is saying
that FAIR is an expressive association and doing so with a glaring absence
71

Id. at 1313.
See Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One indication that the lower
courts [in FAIR] paid insufficient attention to this [expressive association]
element is their failure to consider state law schools as members of
FAIR.”).
73
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (emphasis added).
74
Id. (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).
76
Id. (emphasis added).
72
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of any analysis on this point whatsoever.77
So what's the big deal? After all, FAIR lost the case. No harm, no foul.
The issue lurking is that the Court implies that public law schools, as
members of the FAIR association, have expressive association rights.78
77

Accord David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers,
100 N.W. U. L. REV. 1637, 1685 (Summer 2006) (noting in FAIR that,
“[a]lthough the Court did not explicitly address the issue of state actors'
First Amendment rights, its decision proceeded on the premise that both
public and private universities possess constitutional speech rights.”); see
also Morriss, supra note 8, at 416 (arguing that the Third Circuit in FAIR
improperly treated the law schools and their faculties as worthy of
associational freedom claims).
78
As far as public versus private members of FAIR, of the known
members, there are no public institutions and four public faculties: The
Faculty of the City University of NY (CUNY) Law School, The Faculty of
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, The Faculty of the
University of Minnesota Law School, and The Faculty of the University of
Puerto Rico Law School. See FAIR Participating Law Schools, supra note
x. As far as institutional membership versus faculty membership, the FAIR
Court does not make any distinction between FAIR in this regard in any
part of its analysis, see supra note x, suggesting that recognition of FAIR
law school faculties as expressive associations is tantamount to recognizing
public law schools as expressive associations for purposes of the First
Amendment analysis. Accord Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 185
(D. Conn. 2005) (finding Yale Law School Faculty members may
successfully assert expressive association claim on behalf of Yale Law
School in another challenge to the Solomon Amendment).
Interestingly, in the Burt case in an early decision by the same Court,
the Department of Defense defended on the ground that, “Yale University,
not the Faculty, is the proper party to bring these claims.” Id. at 160. But in
that earlier case, the Court found that the Faculty Members “were the
governing body of YLS.” Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F.Supp.2d 189, 199-200
(D. Conn. 2004). Thus, whether law faculties may be able to assert an
expressive association claim on behalf of their law schools may in turn
depend on whether they establish the rules, by majority, that govern and
regulate their law school. See also Morriss, supra note 8, at 452 n. 161 (in
discussing the membership of FAIR commenting that, “[i]t is unclear what
distinction is intended by the description of ‘about half’ of FAIR's members
as ‘law schools’ and the other half as ‘law faculties.’ It may indicate
something about the official position of the dean.”). For purposes of this
article, it is assumed that at least one, if not more, of the FAIR public law
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And even though the Court found in FAIR itself that those rights were not
significantly burdened by the Solomon Amendment and there was not a
First Amendment violation, one could foresee these public law schools and
other public employers generally, arguing in future cases that their
expressive association rights permit them to not accept employee members
they do not desire.79 Indeed, the FAIR Court's expressive association
analysis hinges to a large degree on the critical point that military recruiters
were not seeking to become “members” of the schools’ expressive
association.80 On the other hand, employees in the form of faculty and staff
seek to become such members and FAIR, consistent with Dale, suggests
that expressive association rights give a group the ability not to accept
members it does not want.81
Nor is there anything in past Supreme Court precedent to suggest that
employers per se cannot be expressive associations. In fact, the Court in
Hishon v. King & Spalding implied just the opposite.82 Such recognition of
public employer constitutional rights could cause a seismic shift in the ongoing balancing of competing public employer and public employee
interests, with the likely result being the diminishment of civil liberties and
civil rights for public employees.
In order to explain how the Court arrived at this unintended state of
affairs, the next section explores how previous expressive association cases
have provided little clue, beyond their own examples, as to the meaning of
an expressive association. The hope is that this brief review of previous
expressive association cases will clarify how the FAIR Court could have
blundered, unanimously, into this significant, inadvertent constitutional
school faculties have the same powers in this regard as the Yale Law School
Faculty and could bring expressive association claims on behalf of their law
schools.
79
For a discussion of the implication of public employer expressive
associations on employee civil rights and civil liberties, see infra Parts IV.B
and IV.C.
80
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312.
81
Id.; Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
82
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (conceding employers could have rights to
association for certain purposes, such as when they make distinctive
contributions to ideas and beliefs of society). That being said, not all
employment decisions are necessarily expressive. See Carpenter, supra
note 63, at 1577 (pointing out that a school might have expressive
association rights when it chooses teachers, who are hired to instill children
with values, but not when selecting maintenance or secretary personnel).
For a more in-depth examination of Hishon, see infra Part III.A.3.
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holding.
III.

THE HISTORICALLY ELUSIVE MEANING OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION

The following narrative places emphasis on exactly how the United
States Supreme Court has determined whether a group qualifies as an
expressive association, as opposed to whether the Court found an expressive
association violation. As will become clear, the Court has yet to articulate
an adequate definition for this constitutional concept.
A. Historical Foundations (1958-1984)
1. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
Interestingly enough, the development of expressive association rights
closely mirrors the progress of the civil rights movement of the second half
of the 20th Century. Indeed, it was in the 1958 Supreme Court decision of
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson83 that the Court first noted that the
ability to associate was a necessary predicate to being able to more fully
exercise one's constitutional rights, including and especially those contained
in the First Amendment.84
In Patterson, in furtherance of a transparent attempt to oust the NAACP
from the state, Alabama sought the production of many documents
including the name and addresses of all NAACP members.85 In an opinion
by Justice Harlan, the Court unanimously found that Alabama could not
compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists consistent with the
NAACP's members' rights to associate with others to promote its common
83

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 460. Other commentators have commenced their historical
exploration of the expressive association right with earlier cases. See, e.g.,
Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1520-21 (starting expressive association
analysis with cases surrounding Espionage Act of 1917); McGowan, supra
note 13, at 126 (beginning historical analysis of expressive association right
with the Court's opinion in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875)). Although there are plausible reasons to start the historical analysis
at other places, I start with Patterson because it represents the first time that
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a First Amendment right to
freedom of association, see Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1524, and this
paper’s focus is on what constitutes a constitutionally-protected expressive
association.
85
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453.
84
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integrationist views.86 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that
effective advocacy on behalf of one's cause is enhanced by group
association.87 Moreover, outing the NAACP members would make
membership in the group less attractive, thereby putting a substantial
restraint on the members’ freedom to associate for a common cause.88
Notably, the discussion of the right to associate in Patterson assumes
the right to associate belongs to the members of the group, not to the group
itself.89 In other words, there is no argument in Patterson that the NAACP
itself had a right to association as an entity. Consequently, at this early time
in the development of the doctrine, there was no need for a conception of
what groups constitute constitutionally protected associations.
2. NAACP v. Button
A few years later, the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider the
scope of associational rights in another case concerning the NAACP,
although this time the Court recognized the NAACP itself had rights to
association. At issue in NAACP v. Button90 was whether Virginia could
prevent the NAACP from recruiting parents to participate in desegregation
cases.91 The Supreme Court again found in favor of the NAACP, finding
that its activities were types of expression and association protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.92
In coming to this conclusion, the Court recognized that organizations
like the NAACP possess rights to associate, separate and apart from the
rights of their members, to engage in such association for the purposes of
advocacy.93 Perhaps because the NAACP was an expressive association
86

Id. at 466.
Id. at 460. Specifically, the Court found that, "[i]t is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." Id.
88
Id. at 462 (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”).
89
Id. (referring to the associational rights at issue in Patterson as
members rights to freedom of association); see also id. at 466 (commenting
that NAACP claiming rights to association on behalf of its members).
90
371 U.S .415 (1963).
91
Id. at 421.
92
Id. at 428-29.
93
See id. ("We think [the NAACP] may assert this right on its own
87
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par excellence, the Court did not undertake an independent analysis to
determine if the nature of the group was sufficiently expressive to qualify
for First Amendment protection. In any event, after Button, there was still
no indication of how to determine which groups did and did not have
associational freedoms under the First Amendment.
3. Hishon v. King & Spalding
After Patterson and Button, there then followed in the 1970s two cases
involving racially discriminatory private schools and their rights to
association.94 In both of these cases, however, private schools were again
assumed, without analysis, to constitute associations for constitutional
purposes (even those such claims ended up being trumped by state
interests). However, in 1984, the Court considered a question which had
not been addressed before; namely, whether private employers could be
considered associations due constitutional protection.
Hishon v. King & Spalding95 concerned a law firm partnership decision
which was alleged to be based on unlawful gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 On the Title VII
issue in contention, the Court found that such partnership decisions were
rightly considered a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and
therefore, a covered employment decision under Title VII.97 One of the law
firm's arguments against this finding was that such an interpretation of Title
VII would unconstitutionally interfere with the law firm's rights to
behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those
activities, claimed to be constitutional protected, which the [Virginia] statue
would curtail.") (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936)). Grosjean held that "a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning
of the equal protection and due process of law clauses." 297 U.S. at 244
(citing Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898)).
94
See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding Mississippi
textbook loan program unconstitutional in lending textbooks to students in
racially discriminatory private schools and finding that state need not
subsidize more effective exercise of private school's right to association);
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (finding federal civil rights law
prohibits racially discriminatory admission practices at private schools even
assuming schools have associational rights).
95
467 U.S. 69 (1984).
96
Id. at 71-72 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - §2000e-17 (2000)).
97
Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77-78.
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association by requiring it to invite unwanted members into its partnership
ranks.98
The Court, however, rejected this argument. Although conceding that
employers and their member employees could have rights to association for
certain purposes, such as when employees make distinctive contributions to
the ideas and beliefs of society (as did the NAACP),99 such rights do not
exist when the employment decision by the association does not implicate
these loftier goals.100 In other words, not all employers are expressive
associations. Employers only have expressive association rights to the
extent that they engage in expressive activities and employing a given
individual would detract from the message they seek to promote.101
However, because the discussion of associational rights is so short and
cryptic in Hishon, it is difficult to say what proposition the case actually
stands for beyond that employers may be associations due constitutional
protections in some circumstances.
B. The Modern Cases (1984-2006)
1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees
A mere six weeks after the decision in Hishon, the landmark case of
Roberts v. United States Jaycees102 broke new ground in the realm of the
freedom of association by introducing an instructive dichotomy. Justice
Brennan's innovation in Roberts is that he classified all previously-decided
association cases into two categories. The right to intimate association
concerns rights to personal liberty located within the due process clause of
the 14th amendment.103 The right to expressive association, on the other
hand, involves association for the promotion of rights found primarily
within the First Amendment.104 The nature and degree of constitutional
98

Id. at 78.
See id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)).
100
Id.; see also Roberts v. United State Jaycees,468 U.S. 609, 637
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]rdinary law practice for commercial
ends has never been given special First Amendment protection …. We
emphasized this point only this term in Hishon v. King & Spalding.").
101
Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1577 (maintaining schools might have
expressive association rights in the employment context when the
employees are central to the expressive activity of the schools).
102
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
103
Id. at 618.
104
Id.
99
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protection depends on the type of association in which a group engages.105
In Roberts, the state interference at issue involved the application of
Minnesota's state public accommodation statute's gender discrimination
provisions to the membership policies of the Jaycees, which did not grant
women full membership in their organization.106 The Court first explained
that the Jaycees were not an intimate association because of its size, lack of
selectivity in defining group membership, and its generally open, public
nature.107 Having eliminated intimate association from consideration, the
Court recognized the Jaycees as a type of expressive association whose
members affiliated with one another to advocate certain views.108
However, the analysis of why the Jaycees are an expressive organization
is very case specific. After making the broad statement that, "we have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the
First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of
a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends,"109 the Court concludes that "in view of the various protected
activities which the Jaycees engage . . . the right is plainly implicated in
this case."110 In turn, Jaycees activities are described later in the opinion as
taking public positions on a number of diverse issues and regularly
engaging "in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other
activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First
105

Id.
Id. at 612-17.
107
Id. at 620-21. Not surprisingly, the Court also found employers do
not have rights of intimate association when selecting employees. See id. at
620 ("[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's
power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to
regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees.").
108
Id. at 622. Even though the Court concluded that the Jaycees had
expressive association rights and those rights were significantly burden by
the application of the public accommodation statute, see id. at 623 ("There
can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire.”), the Court nevertheless held that the State’s
compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination justified the
infringement on the group’s rights. Id. (finding infringements of expressive
association rights justified if state law serves "compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
109
Id.
110
Id.
106
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Amendment."111 Thus, in its first foray into describing what groups
constitute an expressive association for First Amendment purposes, the
Court gives us an example of an expressive association without any
defining or limiting principles.112
In addition to Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court in
Roberts, Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurrence, that while never
adopted by the Court, is significant because it sets the stage in some
respects for the next significant expressive association case of Dale v. Boy
Scouts of Am.113 In particular, O'Connor's opinion places emphasis on the
type of association as opposed to the content of the group message.
O’Connor also advances an interesting way of thinking about whether
employers should be considered to have expressive association rights.
Contrary to Justice Brennan's dichotomy, Justice O'Connor suggests that
non-intimate association cases should be further broken down into
expressive association cases and commercial association cases in order to
accord sufficient protection to expressive associations, while at the same
time placing appropriate burdens on groups claiming the protection of the
First Amendment for commercial association purposes.114 Whereas those
associations that were predominantly expressive were due substantial
protection from governmental interference,115 O'Connor argued that
commercial associations were largely non-expressive and, therefore, state
regulation was permissible as long as it was rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.116 Indeed, this is how O'Connor characterized the
Hishon decision: as nothing more than a large law firm engaging in
commercial associations lacking expressive content.117 Further, Justice
O'Connor suggests that most employment is part of a commercial
111

Id. at 626-27.
David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121,
132 (2001); Hills, supra note x, at 215.
113
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
114
Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Nevertheless, O'Connor does
recognize that "[m]any associations cannot readily be described as purely
expressive or purely commercial" and that, "[t]he standard for deciding just
how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough
to suspend the association's First Amendment right to control its
membership cannot . . . be articulated with simple precision." Id. at 635.
115
Id. at 633.
116
Id. at 634-635.
117
Id. at 637 ("[O]rdinary law practice for commercial ends has never
been given special First Amendment protection . . . . We emphasized this
point only this term in Hishon v. King & Spalding.").
112
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association which can be readily regulated by states without fear of
impinging upon any constitutional right to association.118
Interestingly, and based on these "radically different constitutional
protections for expressive and non-expressive associations," O'Connor ends
up concurring in the judgment of the Court that the Jaycees may not rely on
an expressive association right to immunize themselves from the application
of the Minnesota public accommodation statute.119 Contrary to the
majority, however, Justice O'Connor finds the Jaycee primarily “promote
and practice the art of solicitation and management,” a distinct commercial
enterprise, and thus are subject to state regulation that meets low level
rational basis review.120
Justice O'Connor thus provides a more helpful test for determining
which groups constitute expressive associations, especially in the
commercial/employment arena.121 It is also clearly supplies a more
rigorous analysis than Justice Brennan's "I know it when I see it" approach.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the 23 years since Roberts has not made
any move to expressly adopt Justice O'Connor's commercial association
test.122 Perhaps if it had, much of the mischief caused by the FAIR
decision’s implicit finding of public employer expressive associations
would have been avoided, as under Justice O'Connor's model most public
employers would be considered commercial associations due limited

118

Id. at 634 ("The Constitution does not guarantee the right to choose
employees . . . or those who engage in simple commercial transactions,
without restraint from the State."). In this regard, O'Connor maintains: “An
association must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of
commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its
membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the
market place of ideas.” Id. at 636.
119
Id. at 638-40.
120
Id. at 639.
121
Accord Farber, supra note 9, at 1498 (“The most serious effort to
explain and justify the special treatment for expressive associations is found
in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts.”); see also Carpenter, supra
note 63, at 1517 (extending O'Connor's Roberts concurrence and arguing
for tripartite approach that treats associations differently depending on the
predominance of protected expression in their activities).
122
But see Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1564 (arguing that although
Court has never adopted Justice O'Connor's commercial association
framework that subsequent case outcomes can be readily explained by
reference to that framework).
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constitutional protection.123
2.

Pre-Dale Cases: Rotary Club of Duarte, New York State Club
Assoc., and Stanglin

In any event, the Court continued on its case-by-case approach in
deciding which groups constituted expressive associations. After Roberts,
there were three further Supreme Court cases in the late 1980s, including
Rotary Club of Duarte and New York State Club Assoc., both of which
engaged in a case specific expressive association analysis of the clubs at
issue.124 Like Roberts itself, these two cases came out in favor of the
government's right to regulate these associations even in light of the
presence of expressive association rights held by some of these groups.125
With regard to whether the groups at issue qualified as expressive
associations, the Court failed again to provide a concrete framework for this
constitutional inquiry. For instance, even though in Rotary Club of Duarte
the Court concluded that the Rotary Club engaged in expressive activities
which were quite limited,126 the Court, undeterred, and with the slightest of
explanations, finds the Club implicitly constitutes an expressive
association.127 Similarly, in New York State Club Association, the Court
123

But see Hills, supra note 113, at 217 (“The difficulty with Justice
O'Connor's theory … is that it places unsupportable weight on the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial organizations.”).
124
New York State Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988)
(finding the New York City public accommodation law did not violate
expressive association rights of private clubs engaged in substantial
commercial activity); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club on Duarte,
481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that application of California Unruh Act
which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women into membership
did not interfere with the expressive association rights of the clubs).
125
New York State Club Assoc., 478 U.S. at 14; Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. at 548-49.
126
See Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545 n.4. For instance, Rotary
Clubs do not take positions on public questions like the Jaycees do. See id.
at 548.
127
Actually, the Court in Rotary Club of Duarte never comes out and
says expressly that Rotary Clubs, whose “basic goals [are] humanitarian
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace,” are
expressive associations, but merely implies it by finding that although
“Rotary Clubs do not take positions on ‘public questions,’ including
political or international issues,” they "engage in a variety of commendable
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sidesteps what groups make up expressive associations and unhelpfully
declares that the local New York public accommodation law does not
infringe "the ability of individuals to form associations that will advocate
public or private viewpoints.
"128
The third, and less known case from this time period, City of Dallas v.
Stanglin,129 does provide some much needed insight into what groups do
not constitute expressive associations. In Stanglin, the City of Dallas
adopted an ordinance restricting admission to specified dance halls to
persons between the ages of 14 and 18.130 The state court of appeals found
that these teenage dance halls violated the expressive association rights of
teenagers to associate with those outside of their age group.131 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that no expressive association existed
among the dance hall patrons.132
Specifically, the Court found that the interest in teenagers and adults
interacting in a dance hall environment was associational in some respects,
but importantly did not "involve the sort of expressive association that the
First Amendment has been held to protect."133 The Court clarified that
merely being patrons of the same business establishment does not qualify a
group as an expressive association. Instead, the group must take a position
on public questions or engage in some of the charitable or civic activities
described in the previous Supreme Court expressive association cases.134
Although this discussion of expressive associations went further in
explaining what groups do not constitute expressive associations, the court
itself recognized the analytical dilemma surrounding these cases when it
observed that, "[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost
every activity a person undertakes
!
!
"
!
!
"135 But having made this observation, the Court conclusorily
service activities that are protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 548.
128
New York State Club Association, 487 U.S. at 13.
129
490 U.S. 19 (1989).
130
Id. at 20.
131
Id. at 21.
132
Id. at 25.
133
Id. at 24.
134
Id. at 24-25. On this point, the Staglin Court makes clear that
associations do not have to engage in politics to benefit from expressive
association rights. Id. at 25.
135
Id. at 25.
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states: “We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons--coming together
to engage in recreational dancing--is not protected by the First
Amendment.”136 Yet another example by which to analogize to subsequent
cases, but not a concrete definition to apply going forward in making
distinctions between expressive associations and non-expressive
associations.
3. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
Unlike Roberts, Rotary Club of Duarte, New York State Club
Association, and Stanglin, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale137
found in favor of a group claiming expressive association rights.138 In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court held that the New
Jersey state public accommodation statute impermissibly infringed on the
expressive association rights of the Boy Scouts by requiring them to have a
gay assistant scoutmaster as a member.139
136

Id.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
138
Id. at 659. If one is considering expressive association cases
chronologically, one may think that the case of Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995),
should be discussed next. But Hurley, concerning the exclusion of a gay
pride group from a privately-organized St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston,
is not properly labeled an expressive association case. Finding parades to
be inherently expressive, the Hurley Court concluded that the parade
organizers could select "the expressive units of the parade from potential
participants," so as not to broadcast a message with which they disagreed.
Id. at 574. But as Justice Stevens correctly noted in his Dale dissent,
Hurley is not an expressive association case because: "Hurley involved the
parade organizers' claim to determine the content of the message they wish
to give at a particular time and place. The standards governing such a claim
are simply different from the standards that govern [the Boy Scout of
America]'s claim of a right of expressive association …. An expressive
association claim … normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a
consistent position on some issue over time." Dale, 530 U.S. at 696
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Consequently, although other commentators have
discussed Hurley as an expressive association case, see Morriss, supra note
8, at 442-43, this article does not treat it as such.
139
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 657-59. More specifically, after finding the
Boy Scouts to be an expressive association, the Court deferred to the
group's description of both its message concerning homosexuality and what
137
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As far as whether the Boy Scouts were an expressive association, the
Court states unequivocally that the first thing that a court should do in an
expressive association is "determine whether the group engages in
'expressive association.’”140 Next, the Court cautions that the expressive
association right is not reserved for advocacy groups (such as the NAACP),
"[b]ut to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of
expression, whether it be public or private."141 Having set forth this rather
broad definition, the Court examines the record, including the Boy Scouts'
mission statement, and concludes that the group's mission is "to instill
values in young people" through activities like camping, archery, and
fishing.142 Based on this mission, the Court concludes: "It seems
indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of
values engages in expressive activity."143 And although Justice Steven's

would impair that message and found that the New Jersey law substantially
interfered with their expressive association rights by forcing the Scouts to
accept a gay assistant scoutmaster. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-653. The
Court then concluded that given the severity of the intrusion into the Boy
Scouts' rights to expressive association by the public accommodation
statute, the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights prevailed. See id. at 657659. These portions of the Dale opinion are discussed in more detail below.
See infra Part IV.A.
140
Id. at 648.
141
Id.
142
See id. at 649.
143
See id. at 650 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The Court's formulation that "[i]t
seems indisputable" is a rather bizarre way of concluding that the Boy
Scouts qualify as an expressive association, see id., and wholly
unconvincing when one considers that, “the Court itself implicitly disputed
[the “transmits values” basis] in Runyon v. McCrary when it held that a
racist private school had no First Amendment entitlement to exclude black
children from its student body.” See Hills, supra note 113, at 215 (citing
Runyon, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976)).
Also interesting, although Chief Justice Rehnquist cites Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts as support for his conclusion that the
Boy Scouts are an expressive association, he does not adopt her expressive
association/commercial association dichotomy from that same concurrence.
It is thus appears that the same Dale analysis may apply in the employment
context, as long as the employer sets out to engage in some expressive
activity beyond a de minimis level.
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dissent takes the majority to task for other reasons,144 he does not dispute
that the Boy Scouts are an expressive association.145
The Dale Court thus follow Roberts in making clear that initially
determining whether a group constitutes an expressive association is
essential to determine whether there has been a violation of the right to
expressive association under the First Amendment.146 Yet, the opinion
provides no workable definition for this determination.147 As before, we
know that the Boy Scouts, like law firms, private schools, social
organizations, and advocacy groups, are expressive associations because the
Supreme Court tells us so. But again, at the risk of being redundant, there is
no overarching principle.
Indeed, it is this historical inability of the Court to provide a more
complete definition for expressive associations that is responsible, at least to
some degree, for permitting a unanimous Court in FAIR to overlook the
ways in which FAIR is, and is not, an expressive association. In turn, this
state of affairs leads the Court inexorably, through omission, to its
unintended conclusion that public law school members of FAIR have
expressive association rights.
4. Post-Dale Circuit Court Opinions on Expressive Associations
Even with the lack of guidance from previous Supreme Court cases, the
Supreme Court in FAIR had other potential sources for finding a principled
way of determining the existence of an expressive association and might
still have avoided its constitutional faux pas. Following the decision in
Dale, a number of federal appellate courts tried to fill the gaps left in the
144

See infra Part IV.B.
See Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1537 ("This is a bigger concession
than it first appears because what makes the [Boy Scouts] an expressive
association is not the political causes it pursues. It does not pursue any, in
the usual sense.").
146
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
147
Accord Morriss, supra note 8, at 451 (arguing that Supreme Court’s
Dale-based jurisprudence fails to give much guidance about how to
distinguish expressive associations from non-expressive associations); Hills,
supra note 113, at 215 (“[T]he Dale majority seems to place no meaningful
limits on the definition of ‘expressive associations.’”).
Professor Morriss explains that this lack of guidance may be due to
the fact that the Court so far has decided easy cases with regard to whether a
group constitutes an expressive association, and “so the examples drawn
from the cases leave significant gaps unfilled” Id.
145
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Court’s reasoning about which groups could qualify as expressive
associations.148 Two in particular deserve special attention given their
relative clarity of thought on the issue: Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh149 and The Circle School v. Pappert,150 both out of the Third
Circuit.
The Pi Lambda Phi considered whether a university fraternity was an
expressive association entitled to protection under the First Amendment
after the university stripped it of its status as a recognized student
organization after it was the subject of a drug raid at its fraternity house.151
As instructed by the Supreme Court in Dale, Judge Becker started his
analysis by considering whether the fraternity was an expressive
association.152 Interestingly, even after recognizing that the Supreme Court
did "not set a very high bar for expressive association," it found the
fraternity did not qualify.153
More specifically, the court found that it was not enough merely to say
that the group was a social association and it was necessary to inquire more
deeply into the nature of the association.154 Based on past language in
Roberts and Dale, the court commented that there was no requirement that
the group be political or even primarily expressive in order to qualify for
constitutional protection.155 Nevertheless, there was, in the court's words, a
"de minimis threshold," for such expressive association claims156 and not
"any possible expression" would do.157 The court concludes that the
fraternity did not meet this de minimis threshold because "[n]othing in the
148

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh decision put it diplomatically when it said the
Supreme Court's analysis in Dale of whether a group is engaging in
expressive association was "very succinct." 229 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
2000).
149
229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000).
150
381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
151
See Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 438-39.
152
See id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 442-43.
155
See id. at 443.
156
Id. at 443-44 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)
(holding that patrons in dance hall not engaged in expressive association)).
157
Id. at 444. (emphasis in original). Judge Becker here cites Stanglin
for the proposition that there has to be more than just a "kernel of
expression" to bring an activity within the protection of the First
Amendment. Id. (quoting Staglin, 490 U.S. at 25).
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record indicates the Chapter ever took a public stance on any issue of
public, political, social, or cultural importance."158
Circle School v. Pappert, decided four years later, also examined the
expressive association issue post-Dale, but found that the private schools at
issue were expressive associations and their rights were violated by a
Pennsylvania law which required these schools to hold recitations of the
Pledge of Allegiance or national anthem at beginning of each school day.159
With regard to whether the private school plaintiffs were expressive
associations, Judge Sloviter found that like the Boy Scouts in Dale, the
private schools engaged in "some form of expression, whether it be public
or private."160 Looking at the record in the case, the court noted that each
of the schools had clear educational philosophies, missions, and goals,
including the mission of providing students with “freedom of choices.”161
Indeed, the court found that schools, by their very nature, are highly
expressive organizations which inculcate their students with their
philosophy and values.162 Thus, combining an analysis of the type of
institution being examined with a more case specific exploration of the
record, the court was able to conclude that these schools were expressive
associations.163
Both Pi Lambda Phi and The Circle School provide a more specific
framework for how to appropriately undertake the initial expressive
association determination. By looking at the nature of the organization, the
purposes for which it is claiming expressive association rights, and the
actual evidence of the record, these courts are able to make a more
grounded determination of the issue.164 On the other side of the question, as
far as limiting such rights, these cases also stand for the proposition that
158

Id. However, the court clarifies that fraternities per se were not
excluded from being expressive associations, but that each entity must be
considered individually. Id.
159
Circle School, 381 F.3d at 174.
160
Id. at 182 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648
(2000)).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. Having thus concluded, the court held that the Pennsylvania
pledge law placed a substantial burden on the schools' expressive
associations without compelling justification and found a First Amendment
violation. See id. at 182-83.
164
This is not to say, however, that these cases provide defining
principles, but only that their analysis is more thorough and well-supported
than previous Supreme Court decisions in the expressive association area.
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even though the Supreme Court has "cast a fairly wide net" in defining
expressive associations;165 nevertheless, a group "must do more than simply
claim to be an expressive association."166
Unfortunately, even this last, most basic of points did not register on the
Supreme Court's radar in FAIR.
IV. THE DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYER
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS
A. From Military Recruiting to Public Employment
Of course, and as discussed in Part II, the United States Supreme Court
in Rumsfeld v. FAIR neither followed the expressive association analysis put
forth by these two Third Circuit opinions, nor did it even follow the clear
three-step analysis for expressive association cases set out by Dale or by the
Third Circuit in its FAIR opinion.167 Had it taken the time to consider that
law schools may be expressive associations for certain limited purposes, but
not for others, and that private and public law schools should be treated
differently for expressive association purposes given the constitutional
issues at stake, it might not have stumbled into this Serbonian bog.168 More
165

Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 443.
Id. at 444.
167
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit in FAIR methodically
set out the elements of the expressive association claim and then considered
each of those elements in turn. See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 231
(3d Cir. 2004). On whether FAIR was an expressive association, the Third
Circuit concluded that it was because it possessed "clear educational
philosophies, missions, and goals." Id. (citing FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 303-04 (D.N.J. 2003)). However, the Third Circuit (as well
as the New Jersey District Court) also failed to appreciate the consequences
of finding public law school to be expressive associations, and this fact
suggests that even if the Supreme Court had engaged in a more thorough
expressive association analysis, it too might have still not considered the
public law school issue lurking in this case.
168
See Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 & n.1 (3d
Cir. 2003) ("A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog, / Betwixt Damiata and
Mount Cassius old, / Where armies whole have sunk.") (citing Milton,
Paradise Lost, ii. 592); see also McGowan, supra note x, at 132 (“Neither
Roberts nor Dale actually develops a theory of group expression. This lack
of development is a problem. One cannot analyze expressive association
cases without some underlying theory of how associations express
166
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specifically, had the FAIR Court considered cases like Pi Lambda Phi and
The Circle School, it might have recognized that although schools are
generally highly expressive organizations; nevertheless, schools can, and
do, express themselves in more ways that just inculcating their students
with values.169 For instance, schools also express themselves by engaging
in the four essential freedoms, as termed by Justice Frankfurter in his
concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.170
Arguing for the exclusion of the government from the intellectual life of
the university, Frankfurter famously stated in his Sweezy concurrence: "It is
the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university--to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."171 Each
of these freedoms is arguably a type of expression, including the ability of
the university to determine for itself who shall teach. Consequently, the
Court's finding in FAIR is not necessarily limited to the law schools'
advocacy against the DADT policy, but could also be seen as protecting the
law schools in deciding whom they wish to teach at their institutions.172
This is because the FAIR court does not indicate that FAIR has been
found to be an expressive association for the limited purpose of protesting
military recruiters on campus, and there is no reason to think that a public
themselves.”).
169
Perhaps in this regard the FAIR Court was merely deferring,
consistent with Dale, to FAIR's own assertions concerning the character of
its expressive association. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
653 (2000). In its trial brief to the Court, FAIR claimed the control over oncampus law school recruiting was "about the freedom of law schools to
shape their own pedagogical environments and to teach, by word and deed,
the values they choose, free from government intrusion." See Memorandum
of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1,
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03 Civ. 4433 (JCL));
see also FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 304 (D.N.J. 2003) ("The
record reveals that the law schools … seek to inculcate a certain set of
values and principles in their students.").
170
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
171
Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
172
Like other groups and associations, employers may engage in some
form of expressive activity. Cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 678-79 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing employers as
expressive associations and limits on such associational rights).
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law school's expressive association rights cannot equally extend to the
employment context.173 Indeed, the Hishon case suggests that employers
who have expressive purposes may be deemed expressive associations.174
Finally, to recognize that all pubic employers have expressive association
rights like the Boy Scouts in Dale is simply a matter of acknowledging that
public law schools are just one potential type of public employer.175
To see why this interpretation of the law, if adopted, would be so
damaging, it is necessary to revisit the Dale decision to see what types of
constitutional protections groups enjoy once deemed expressive
organizations.
B. The Impact of Dale Deference on Public Employee Civil Rights
In discussing the nature of the right to expressive association in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,176 the Supreme Court gave some important
additional powers to expressive associations to be free from government
regulation that did not exist previously under Roberts v. United States
Jaycees177 and which could have sweeping consequences for federal and
state antidiscrimination laws.178 Indeed, as Justice Stevens comments in his
173

Although employment relationship are not directly discussed, the
FAIR decision does indirectly suggest that covered membership decisions
might include employment ones. Cf. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 ("Law
schools … 'associate' with military recruiters in the sense they interact with
them. But recruiters are not part of the law school."); id. at 1313 ("The
Solomon Amendment has no similar effect on a law school's associational
rights. Students and faculty are free to associate to voice their approval of
the military's message; nothing about the statute affects the composition of
the group by making group membership less desirable.").
174
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
175
Accord Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1564 (maintaining expressive
associations like the Boy Scouts in Dale should be protected in their
selection of members and employees). This is not to say that all
employment decisions undertaken by an expressive association are subject
to associational freedoms. As Professor Carpenter points out, a school
might have expressive association rights when it chooses teachers, but it
might not have such a right when selecting maintenance or secretary
personnel. See id. at 1577. Whereas the former employees are central to the
expressive activity of the schools, the latter are not.
176
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
177
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
178
McGowan, supra note 13, at 125 (maintaining that, “[t]he Court's
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Dale dissent, the amount of deference given to the Boy Scout's assertions
concerning the nature of their expressive activities is simply astounding.179
For instance, once a group is considered an expressive association, a
court must determine the nature of the group's expression.180 However, the
scope of that inquiry is limited and the Court indicated in Dale that it was
proper not only to give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, but also to the association's view of what would
impair that expression.181 So, in Dale, even though the evidence was
extremely thin that the Boy Scouts were actually promoting an antihomosexual message,182 the Court deferred to its anti-homosexual
assertions and also to the claim that inclusion of a gay assistant scoutmaster
would force the organization to send a message inconsistent with the Boy
stated deference [in Dale] was inconsistent with its analysis in prior
cases.”).
179
See Dale, 530 U.S, at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Once the
organization 'asserts' that it engages in particular expression …. '[w]e
cannot doubt' the truth of that assertion. This is an astounding view of the
law.") (internal citations omitted); id. ("It is an odd form of independent
review that consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims."); see
also Hills, supra note 113, at 215 (“[O]ne looks in vain to Dale for some
persuasive, principled, or even predictable limit on the First Amendment
protections enjoyed by associations.”).
180
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
181
See id. at 653. Going even further, the Court went on to say that,
"associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a
certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that
could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection." Id. at 655.
Consequently, in the employment context, an employer could claim that
hiring a certain individual as a member of its organization is inconsistent
with its views on a certain controversial topic, even though it did not engage
in that hiring for the purpose of taking a stance on that topic.
182
See id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In light of [the Boy Scouts of
America]'s self-proclaimed ecumenism . . . it is even more difficult to
discern any shared goals or common moral stance on homosexuality."); se
also id. at 675 ("Beyond the single sentence in these policy statements,
there is no indication of any shared goal of teaching that homosexuality is
incompatible with being 'morally straight' and 'clean.'"); id. at 684 ("There
is no shared goal or collective effort to foster a belief about homosexuality
at all--let alone one that is significantly burdened by admitting
homosexuals.").
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Scout's stance on homosexuality.183 Indeed, based on the Boy Scouts'
assertions, it found that the New Jersey public accommodations law, which
would have required inclusion of the gay assistant scoutmaster, caused a
"severe intrusion" on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association that outweighed any countervailing compelling interest that the
state had in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination from society.184
Dale thus establishes that the expressive association determination is
fraught with significant legal implications for those who seek to become
members of these expressive groups, including their ability to rely on
federal and state antidiscrimination laws.185
It may first appear that FAIR, which does not concern a membership
situation like Dale,186 does not have much to add to Dale as far as the
183

See id. at 648 ("Forcing a group to accept certain members may
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views,
that it intends to express. Thus, '[f]reedom of association . . . plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.'") (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
Justice Stevens rightly criticized the majority decision for kow-towing to
the litigation posture of the Boy Scouts, rather than conducting an
independent analysis of whether the Boy Scouts were in fact expressing an
anti-homosexual lifestyle message. See id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Stevens would require instead that a group adopt and advocate an
unequivocal position before permitting assertions of an expressive
association right. See id. at 687; see also id. at 696 ("An expressive
association claim … normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a
consistent position on some issue over time."). But see Carpenter, supra
note 63, at 1542-63 (criticizing Justice Steven's message-based approach on
four different grounds).
184
Although Dale appears to imply that the state has a compelling
interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination, it does not come
out and say it expressly as in previous cases. See id. at 658. Furthermore,
the Court lessens the importance of that compelling interest by saying that,
"the association interest in freedom of expression has been set on one side
of the scale, and State's interest on the other." Id. at 658-59.
185
See Farber, supra note 9, at 1492-93 (“[T]he upshot of the majority
opinion seems to be that once an association is identified as expressive, any
colorable claim of interference with its activities is enough to block
application of anti-discrimination laws (at least in cases where the Court
does not find the particular state interest particularly compelling).”).
186
See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312 (2006); see also
Morriss, supra note 8, at 451. Professor Morriss argues that whereas
previous cases have dealt with the expressiveness of association, the
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consequences of labeling an organization an expressive association. But as
discussed above, FAIR can be read as providing expressive association
rights to public law schools.187 In fact, combining the holdings in FAIR and
Dale leads to the startling conclusion that public employers can engage in
expressive activities, define the nature of their expressive association,
determine which prospective or current employees impair the message of
their association, and then disassociate from those individuals (by not hiring
or taking other adverse employment action), all without violating
potentially applicable federal and state antidiscrimination law.188 To make
these consequences more concrete, take just a few hypotheticals.
First, consider a city police force that fires a female police offer on the
grounds that rather than carry a fetus to term, she has an abortion. The
police department wishes to propound a particular point of view that
abortion is inconsistent with its mission of protecting the lives of the
innocent and believes that the continued employment of the female police
officer would impair that message. As will be discussed in more detail
below,189 that female police officer might have substantive due process
arguments in her favor in light of Lawrence v. Texas,190 but it is anyone's
guess whether those interests would be considered compelling enough to
overcome the "severe intrusion" on the police force's expressive association
rights occasioned by having to maintain the employment of that police
officer. Moreover, to the extent that the female police officer counters with
a claim of sex discrimination, it is likely that such a claim will be trumped

Supreme Court in FAIR should have focused on the associational nature of
the expressiveness, see id., and found that law schools and law faculties are
not such independent associations. See id. at 457. As it turns out, the
Supreme Court chose not utilize Professor Morriss’ argument in its analysis.
187
See supra Parts II.C, IV.A.
188
As Justice Stevens observes in his Dale dissent, this aspect of Dale
seems completely at odds with previous expressive association cases which
found that right to expressive association did not mean "that in every setting
in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates,
their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the
Constitution." See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 678 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing New York State Club Assn. Inc. v. City of
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)); see also Farber, supra note 9, at 149293 (suggesting Dale could mean that associational rights trump contrary
civil rights under antidiscrimination law).
189
See infra Part IV.C.2.
190
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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by the police department's associational rights under the Dale analysis.191
Second, contemplate for a moment the hypothetical brought up by
Justice Souter in his Dale dissent, in which an individual becomes "so
identified with a position as to epitomize it publicly."192 Once a group is
recognized as an expressive association, Justice Souter indicates that such
high profile individuals may be excluded by those expressive groups to
maintain the effectiveness of their message, even if such exclusions would
normally run afoul of otherwise applicable federal and state
antidiscrimination laws.193 Needless to say, Justice Souter's hypothetical
could easily apply to the employment context.
Finally, reflect on the lower court decision in the FAIR case itself. The
district court concluded that since the law schools had adopted official
policies with respect to sexual orientation, the law schools qualify as
expressive associations.194 In coming to this conclusion, the court noted
that FAIR law schools believe that "invidious discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is a moral wrong, and that 'judgments about people
bearing no relation to merit harm and inhibits students, faculty, and
eventually society at large.'"195 Given the nature of the law schools'
expressive association, and Dale's notion that courts should defer to group's
notion about what would impair their expression,196 it would appear that a
FAIR law school could argue that hiring a prospective faculty member with
a background in the military's JAG Corp. would be tantamount to hiring a
person with anti-gay views and refuse to hire such a person. As absurd as
that claim may sound to some, remember that Dale counsels extreme
deference to both the nature of an association's expression, as well as what
191

See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (finding Boy Scouts' expressive
association rights outweigh any competing state interests in eradicating
discrimination).
192
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 672 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193
See id. ("When that position is at odds with a group's advocated
position, applying an antidiscrimination statute to require the group's
acceptance of the individual in a position of group leadership could so
modify or muddle or frustrate the group's advocacy as to violate the
expressive associational right."). Justice Souter also makes clear that the
popularity or unpopularity of the group's message will be irrelevant in such
situations. See id. ("[I]t is at least clear that our estimate of the progressive
character of the group's position will be irrelevant to the First Amendment
analysis if such a case comes to us for decision.").
194
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 304 (D.N.J. 2003).
195
Id.
196
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.

38

Paul M. Secunda

[18-Jan-07

would impair that expression.197 And if that member of the military makes
a claim of discrimination based on veterans' status under a state
employment antidiscrimination statute, he or she would probably lose as a
result of the law school's contrary associational claims.
In short, and as these examples make clear, the recognition of
expressive association rights for public law schools, and by extension all
public employers, would entail a vast accretion of employer power to
potentially exclude unpopular, controversial, or just plain disagreeable,
employees from the public sector. Even more troubling, this power to
exclude employees would be largely immunized from antidiscrimination
laws.198
C. The Effects of Public Employer Expressive Association Rights on
Existing Public Employee Constitutional Rights
As detrimental as Dale expressive association rights might be in the
public employment context for employee civil rights, this constitutional
development also bodes ill for already vastly diminished constitutional
rights of public employees. Even under the present state of affairs, since
public employee free speech rights reached their apogee in Pickering v. Bd.
of Education,199 such rights have been greatly weakened in the last forty
years as a result of the "public concern" test of Connick v. Myers,200 and the
more recent "official capacity speech" test of Garcetti v. Ceballos.201
But the situation would become even worse with the recognition of
public employer expressive association rights. Quite simply, it is a zerosum game and whatever additional leverage the government obtains to
make employment decisions through these new expressive association
rights must necessarily lead to public employees having less constitutional
protection against such decisions. A couple real world examples, one
academic in the First Amendment context and one non-academic in the
197

Id. at 653.
There is a counter-argument that since Dale was decided in 2000
there has not been many private employers advancing associational claims
with a related reduction of employee civil rights in the private sector.
However, whereas Hishon did not clearly establish employer expressive
association claims (and even seems to argue against them under the facts of
that case), FAIR may be more readily interpreted to provide for such claims
in both the public and private employment sector. Only time will tell.
199
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
200
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
201
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
198
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substantive due process context, will suffice to illustrate the point.
1. The Case of Robert Delahunty
A controversy erupted at the University of Minnesota Law School202 in
late Fall 2006, involving the hiring of a visiting constitutional law professor
from the University of St. Thomas Law School, Robert Delahunty.203
Professor Delahunty held a previous position in the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel, where he co-authored the now-infamous torture
memo on war prisoners.204 When word got out that Minnesota planned to
appoint Professor Delahunty to this position, a number of Minnesota law
professors sent an open letter205 and a significant number of students
circulated a petition, both protesting the appointment as being antithetical to
the core values held by the institution.206 Specifically, the student petition
stated: "We would like to make clear that we are supportive of an
ideologically diverse faculty, we would simply prefer that the University be
extremely protective of its reputation by hiring faculty that are beyond
question ethically."207 As it turns out, the interim co-dean of the University
202

Interestingly, the Faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School
is one of the public law school members of FAIR. See supra note x.
203
See Paul D. Thacker, Appointment Roils a Law School, INSIDE
HIGHER ED, at http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/29/delahunty
(November 29, 2006).
204
See id. The memo "concluded that the Geneva Convention did not
cover al-Qaeda suspects captured in Afghanistan, and helped lay the
foundation for the Bush administration’s handling of prisoners captured
during the war on terror." Id.; see also generally Robert J. Delahunty &
John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 487 (2002).
205
See Thacker, supra note 206 (link to faculty letter available in
article).
206
See id.
207
See Petition to Ask the Deans to Reconsider the Hiring of Robert
Delahunty, available at http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/29/
delahunty (November 29, 2006) (click on "circulating a petition" link in
article). The petition went on to state: "We place a considerable value on
the reputation that comes with being in a law school with this level of
prestige, and we would like to avoid any negative connotations that will
result from hiring a person with such a negative and divisive reputation as
Delahunty." See id.
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of Minnesota did not to bow to the pressure not to appoint Delahunty and
Delahunty began teaching classes at Minnesota Law in mid-January 2007.
Nevertheless, the story provides an opportunity to consider what the
detrimental impact would be on public employees' First Amendment rights
if a public law school had constitutional rights of expressive association.208
In this regard, Roberts v. United States Jaycees makes clear that expressive
associations have the right to be free from "intrusion into the[ir] internal
structure of affairs,"209 and such groups cannot be forced, without
compelling justification, to accept members they do not desire.210 And
although compelling justifications may have existed for the Jaycees and
Rotarians to be forced to have female members,211 it is unlikely that the
same level of justification exists to force Minnesota Law School to
208

Now, it may be that the First Amendment rights of public employees
like Delahunty are already, without any consideration of expressive
association rights, severely circumscribed by the "government speech"
doctrine, under which the government employer may claim, without First
Amendment concern, the ability to hire only those individuals willing to
transmit its values or propound its chosen point of view. See Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) ("[I]t seems
inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and
other expression to advocate and its own policies. We have generally
assumed…that compelled funding of government speech does not along
raise First Amendment concerns."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93
(1991) ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds.'") (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). As will be
explored below, however, the government speech doctrine is probably most
tenuous in the public university professor context. See infra Part V.B.2.
209
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (citing
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975)). The Court notes in
Roberts that associational rights can also be unconstitutionally infringed by
governmental action in one of two other ways: (1) by imposing penalties or
withholding benefits from individuals because of their membership in a
disfavored group, see id. at 622 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 18084 (1972)); and (2) requiring disclosure of the fact of membership in a
group seeking anonymity. Id. at 622-23 (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers
'74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982)).
210
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. In other words, the freedom of association
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. Id.
211
See id. at 624; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club on Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987).
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associate with Delahunty.
Furthermore, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale gave great
deference to not only the group's assertions about the nature of their
expression, but also to its views about what would impair that expression.212
Thus, in a world where a public law school has expressive association
rights, the school might not hire a Professor Delahunty in order a transmit a
certain set of values, and not others.213 Indeed, the student petition against
Delahunty relied on an argument of this type when it requested that the
Minnesota Law School not affiliate with anyone of questionable ethical
background.214 Finally, recall that Justice Souter indicated in his Dale
dissent that in cases where a high profile individual becomes the public
embodiment of a certain controversial position, like Delahunty has on the
torture issue, expressive associations should be able to insulate their
expression by disassociating from such individuals.215
Professor Delahunty would likely respond to this invocation of
expressive association rights by the law school by claiming that his past
stance on matters of public concern are protected from adverse employment
actions by the First Amendment. Indeed, cases like Pickering v. Bd. of
Education216 and Connick v. Myers217 stand for the proposition that public
employee have certain rights to speech and expression for which they
cannot be retaliated against, unless the public employer can point to

212

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
Stanley Fish, for one, does not agree that, “schools should[] have
values, except in a very narrow sense,” and " should avoid taking a political
stance at all cost." Indeed, Fish brought up the FAIR case to illustrate his
point. See Elia Powers, A Freewheeling Academic Freedom Debate, INSIDE
HIGHER ED, at http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/05/acfreedom
(January 5, 2007) (describing remarks Fish made during the 2007 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)).
214
See supra note x and accompanying text.
215
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 672 (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course in
Justice Souter's hypothetical, he was suggesting that such expressive
association rights of a group would overcome any contrary
antidiscrimination mandates. See id. Because Professor Delahunty is not
likely to be able to claim the protection of such laws (as ideological
discrimination is not a protected statutory category), it is less likely that his
hiring decision would be even more susceptible to a expressive association
claim.
216
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
217
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
213
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overriding and legitimate efficiency interests.218 But Pickering First
Amendment claims are rather weak ones in the constitutional hierarchy of
rights, given the needs of government employers to run their workplaces.219
Such rights, even under present doctrine, may be overcome by the mere
showing by the employer that the employee's expression would
substantially disrupt their enterprise.220 On the other hand, expressive
association rights are much more sacrosanct and may be overcome only "by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly,
less restrictive of associational freedoms."221
Consequently, if one were to balance public employer expressive
association rights against public employee Pickering First Amendment
rights, given the nature of the interests involved, it is more than likely that
the government employer would prevail in the vast majority of these cases.
Put differently, it is unlikely that the somewhat attenuated public employee
right to free speech would qualify as the compelling state interest necessary
to overcome the public employer's expressive association rights. In short,
this hypothetical exercise indicates that recognition of public law school
expressive association rights in a case like Delahunty's would almost
certainly diminish individual public employee's rights to free speech and
expression.222
218

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44.
See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being
Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to
Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85,
97 (2006) (hereinafter, Secunda, Neglected Importance) ("Yet even though
the government employer does have unfettered discretion when it comes to
impinging upon the exercise of its employee's constitutional rights, it does
retain substantial latitude when setting the terms and conditions of its
employees' employment, a discretion which is not available in its dealing
with the same individuals as citizens.") (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos,, 126 S.
Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
674 (1996); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality
opinion)).
220
See id. at 101 (discussing substantial disruption theory of Pickering
line of cases) (citing Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee
Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005)).
221
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
222
Now, some might like this outcome because they do not agree with
Professor Delahunty's views on torture. But one could easily imagine a
similar case involving a public employee with more progressive views
219
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2. The Case of Debora Hobbs
The impact of FAIR expanding expressive association rights would
not be limited to either public law schools or to the First Amendment, as the
next example illustrates. In a previous piece, I wrote about a female sheriff
dispatcher, Debora Hobbs, in Penders County, North Carolina, who was
told by her supervising sheriff, Carson Smith, to marry her live-in
boyfriend, move out, or lose her job.223 The sheriff based his actions on a
state cohabitation statute from 1805 and, in fact, the female dispatcher lost
her position when she refused to comply.224 Without there being an
expressive association right upon which the sheriff department could rely,
the dispatcher sued in state court and won based on the court finding, in
light of Lawrence v. Texas,225 that her firing unconstitutionally infringed her
liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.226 Although the state court's exact reasoning does not appear
to have been published, it is likely that its decision is based on the
proposition that a public employer must have a substantial and legitimate
interest before interfering with an employee's off-duty private and personal
decisions in matters pertaining to sex.227
But what if the Penders County Sheriff could claim a right to
expressive association on behalf of the sheriffs’ department based on the
being excluded from the association of a more conservative public law
school. Suppose like the Boy Scouts, a conservative public university does
not want to hire a gay rights activist? Again, the rights afforded to
expressive associations under Roberts, Dale, and similar cases, would seem
to permit the university to take this action even though this would appear to
be an instance of a governmental entity interfering with a public employee's
First Amendment rights.
223
See Secunda, supra note 222, at 131-32 (citing Steve Hartsoe, ACLU
Challenges N.C. Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06).
224
See id.
225
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas anti-sodomy statute based
on liberty interest individuals have in making decisions about their personal
and private lives).
226
See Paul M. Secunda, North Carolina Cohabitation Law Struck
Down in Case of Female Sheriff Dispatcher, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2006/07/north_carolina_.h
tml (July 21, 2006). I refer to this liberty interest recognized in Lawrence
as a public employee's right to decisional non-interference in private affairs.
See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 115-19.
227
See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 116.
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holding in FAIR? The argument would go that central to maintaining the
image and credibility of a law enforcement agency in a socially
conservative part of the country is the ability to hire only those individuals
who hold the traditional values of their community, including the values
surrounding traditional forms of marriage. Thus, requiring the sheriff's
department to maintain in employment those who choose to express other
values by cohabitating without being married (whether they be
heterosexuals and homosexuals) could be seen as forcing the department to
promote non-traditional conduct outside of marriage as a legitimate form of
behavior.
Dale stands for the proposition that expressive associations have the
right not to be forced to send a message that is contrary to their chosen
beliefs.228 As discussed previously, Dale's notion is also that a court must
defer to the organization's characterization of its expression, as well as the
organization's belief as to what would impair it.229
These principles
suggest that a court reviewing Penders County’s decision to fire Debora
Hobbs for cohabitation would have little ability to inquire into the bona
fides of the County’s putative values and would have to take the County at
its word that its expressive association would be harmed by having as
members those with nontraditional values such as Hobbs.
Nor would a reading of Lawrence v. Texas that recognizes a heightened
liberty interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs make a
difference once public employers were endowed with expressive association
rights. Although the modified Pickering analysis that I previously proposed
would not permit a public employer to interfere with its employee’s private
and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex) without legitimate
and substantial justification,230 the public employers' right to expressive
association, to choose not to propound a point of view contrary to its belief,
would certainly suffice as such a substantial and legitimate justification.
Thus, recognition of public employer expressive association rights would
also turn the clock back on public employee civil liberties outside of the
academy and retard newly emerging substantive due process rights for
public employees before they even had the chance to take root and flourish.

228

See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Protection of the
association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition
that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice,
and the selection of members is the definition of that voice.").
229
See id.
230
See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 118-19.
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A. The Structural Argument Against Public Expressive Associations
Although there are a number of normative reasons illustrated above
which counsel against recognizing public law schools and public employers
as expressive associations, the most persuasive argument against the
Supreme Court's inadvertent holding in Rumsfeld v. FAIR is a structural
one. It is simply this: the Bill of Rights is about protecting the rights of the
governed, not the governing.231
In this regard, the discussion in the recent case of Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action v. Granholm is instructive.232 The Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action case concerned whether the court should preliminarily
enjoin the recently-adopted Michigan anti-racial-preferences amendment
from going into effect, especially that part that applies to public
universities.233 The court denied the sought after injunctive relief based on
231

Justice Stewart made this very point in his concurrence in Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 139
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press
from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the
Government."). As David Fagundes has pointed out in his recent piece on
government speech, and though he himself thoughtfully challenges this
notion, Stewart’s concurrence remains the majority view in this area of the
law. See Fagundes, supra note 78, at 1643 (“[W]hen the question of
whether the First Amendment applies to government speech has arisen,
judges have typically acknowledged Justice Stewart's concurrence without
critical reflection … resulting in what one district court called ‘the wellsettled point of law that the First Amendment protects only citizens' speech
rights from government regulation, and does not apply to government
speech itself.’") (citing Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129
F. Supp. 2d 941, 944-45 (W.D. Va. 2001)); see also Morriss, supra note 8,
at 440 ("These [state law school members of FAIR], as instrumentalities of
state government, have no First Amendment rights.").
232
No. 06-2640, 2006 WL 3831217 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 2006).
233
See id. at *1. "On November 7, 2006, the people of Michigan
approved a statewide ballot initiative--Proposal 2--which amended the
Michigan Constitution to prohibit discrimination or preferential treatment
based on race or gender in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting in the State. Under the Michigan
Constitution, the proposal was scheduled to go into effect on December 23,
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its holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendment permit states to use
certain forms of affirmative action, but does mandate that they do so.234
In its losing argument, the public universities in Michigan235 argued
that, "they have an academic freedom right, based in the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, to select their students and that they
may, in the course of doing so, give some consideration to such factors ... as
race."236 Dismissing this argument, the Sixth Circuit made the point that
their "interests" in selecting a diverse student body should not be confused
with them having actual First Amendment rights.237 After all, the court
observed, it is not at clear "how the Universities, as subordinate organs of
the State, have First Amendment rights against the State or its voters."238 In
other words, the Constitution protects the people from the state, not the state
from the people.239
2006." Id.
234
Id.
235
The public universities are the University of Michigan, Michigan
State University, and Wayne State University. Id.
236
Id. at *3; see also id. at *9. Interestingly, with regard to an
institutional academic freedom right, Professor William Van Alstyne of the
William & Mary College of Law observed at a recent panel discussion on
academic freedom at the 2007 Annual Meeting of Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) that although there were some 30 decisions from the
Supreme Court using the doctrine of institutional academic freedom, not
one of them relied directly on that right for its holding, choosing instead to
rely on other constitutional bases. (Notes of Talk on File with Author -podcast of talk should be posted soon).
237
See id. at *9 ("The Universities mistake interests grounded in the
First Amendment-- including their interests in selecting student bodies-with First Amendment rights.").
238
Id. (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518
(1819)).
239
See id.; see also Fagundes, supra note 78, at 1638 ("[T]he Speech
Clause is typically understood as a bulwark of protection against--rather
than a source of rights for--government."); see also id. at 1639 ("Courts
have varied in their receptivity to the notion that the First Amendment may
extend to government speech. The majority of courts have reflexively
rejected the notion, relying on the assumption that the First Amendment can
only restrict, not protect, state actors.") (citing Muir v. Ala. Educ.
Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)).
But see Nadel v. Regents of the University of California, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing speech rights for government
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Nor does the analysis change when considering one of the points
emphasized in Grutter v. Bollinger,240 that universities' academic decisions
should be given a substantial degree of deference by the courts.241 The
Sixth Circuit in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action points out that the
Grutter Court more specifically stated that this degree of deference should
only be granted "within constitutionally prescribed limits"242 and "[o]ne of
those 'constitutionally prescribed limits,' . . . is the separate requirement of
narrow tailoring-- an inquiry that no one maintains may be satisfied simply
by invoking a university's legitimate, but hardly dispositive, interest in
academic freedom."243 Based on this line of reasoning, the court concludes
that the universities have no First Amendment right to continue their racial
preferences as part and parcel of their rights to institutional academic
freedom.244
It then follows that if universities do not have a First Amendment right
actors); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387,
1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
240
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
241
See id. at 328-29 ("We have long recognized that, given the
important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.").
242
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 2006 WL 3831217, at *9
(emphasis added).
243
Id.
244
See id. at *10. But see Fagundes, supra note 78, at 1662
(maintaining that, “[t]he majority rule proscribing constitutional status for
government speech … fails to account for a scenario in which the federal
government wrongly attempts to restrict the speech of another sovereign, or
where government speech merits application of a statute or common law
doctrine that is designed to safeguard constitutional speech interests.”).
Although Fagundes’ thoughts on the First Amendment rights of state actors
are thought-provoking, his categories for when government speech should
be constitutionally protected nonetheless do not appear to cover instances in
which state public universities or public employers seek to assert
constitutional rights against the contrary First Amendment rights of their
public employees. In other words, public employment does not raise the
more difficult question of whether a state sovereign should have
constitutional rights against the federal sovereign under some combination
of the 1st and 10th Amendments, see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, but rather
the relatively easy question concerning whether the states should have
constitutional rights against individuals.
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to select diverse student bodies, then surely the university even has less of a
right to such constitutional protections when selecting members of its
faculty and its staff. Although deciding whom to teach is one of the four
essential freedom discussed by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in
Sweezy just as much as deciding who to admit to study,245 the Supreme
Court has historically given less deference to non-academic decisions by
universities because courts are considered to have more experience with
dealing with issue of the non-academic variety, such as disciplinary
decisions.246 Thus, if the public universities in Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action do not have First Amendment rights to select their
students, they certainly should not have those rights to select their faculty.
Given the strength of these structural arguments, it is very likely that if
the Supreme Court were to consider the issue head on, it would not deem
the FAIR public law schools, or any other public employer, to be expressive
associations. This inadvertent holding appears to have occurred as a result
of the Court spending most of its analytical energies on more difficult areas
in FAIR, such as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
Congressional power to raise and support armies, and a number of obtuse
First Amendment speech doctrines, including the doctrines of compelled
speech and expressive conduct.247 Even in the expressive association
portion of the case, the Court seems unconcerned about the nature or the
constituents of the FAIR expressive association and focuses instead on
whether having military recruiters on law school campuses significantly
burdens law school rights to expressive association (answering that question

245

See supra note x and accompanying text.
See Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225
(1985) ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the
faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it
is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually
exercise professional judgment."); Bd. of Curators of the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978) ("Academic evaluations of
a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance
to the judicial and administrative factfinding proceedings to which we have
traditionally attached a full hearing requirement …. the determination
whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the
procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.").
247
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306-11 (2006).
246
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in the negative).248
In any event, because of the confusion surrounding this area of the law,
the Court should not merely correct this oversight in the next case in which
it has the opportunity to discuss expressive association rights, but it should
set out a coherent understanding of what type of rights public employers,
including public universities acting in that capacity, have in deciding how
best to convey certain messages to the public and protect their institutions'
core values. In this vein, the Court should take their cue from the Sixth
Circuit and deem such important claims to be "interests" rather than "rights"
and analyze these interests with other governmental efficiency concerns
under the Connick/Pickering First Amendment free speech framework. At
the same time, the Court should step back from the abyss it reached in
Garcetti v. Ceballos and not too quickly assume that all government
employees are engaged in government speech without First Amendment
protection every time they speak or express themselves in line with their job
duties.
B. A Return to Pickering Efficiency Interests and A Detour Around the
Government Speech Doctrine
1. Pickering Efficiency Interests
To reiterate a point made in the last section, the current deference that
courts pay to university academic judgments are better conceived of as
interests grounded in the First Amendment, rather than constitutional rights.
This conception of the academic employer having certain interests in
exercising discretion in deciding who to hire and retain as employees is
consistent with similar governmental efficiency interests already discussed
in the Pickering line of cases.
Pickering v. Bd. of Education249 was most recently revisited by the
Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos.250 In Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for
Los Angeles County, Richard Ceballos, was subjected to adverse
employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly defective search
warrant in a criminal case.251 The question presented to the Supreme Court
was whether Ceballos had engaged in protected speech under the First
Amendment, such that he could not be retaliated against for his actions with

248

Id. at 1312.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
250
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
251
See id. at 1955-56.

249
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regard to the search warrant.252
In its analysis in Ceballos, the Court noted that the Connick/Pickering
analysis requires courts in public employee free speech cases to consider
whether the employee spoke on a matter of a public concern in his or her
capacity as a citizen253 and if so, then balance the First Amendment interests
of the employee against the governmental interests of the employer to run
an efficient governmental service.254
The governmental interests
recognized in Pickering are not in any sense constitutional rights, but rather
a recognition of the interests a government employer has in maintaining "a
significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions"
because "without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision
of public services."255 The balance undertaken in Pickering is required
because even though the government employer performs "these important
public functions,"256 and consequently far broader powers in its employer
capacity than in its sovereign capacity;257 nevertheless, "a citizen who
works for the government is nonetheless a citizen"258 and the First
252

Id. at 1955. As far as answering that question, the Court found in
Ceballos that because Ceballos was engaged in expression consistent with
his job duties, he was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, but only as a government employee. As such, the Court concluded
that Ceballos did not have any First Amendment protection and there was
no need to conduct a Pickering balancing of interests. See id. at 1960
("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.").
253
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
254
See Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). I have
recently argued that this same type of Pickering analysis should be extended
to the substantive due process area in the context of sexual privacy rights in
light of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003). Under this reasoning, employees should also be free from
decisional interference by their employers in their private and personal
affairs, unless the government can point to overriding efficiency interests.
See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 122-24.
255
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1958 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143).
256
See id. at 1959 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384
(1987)).
257
See id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion)).
258
Id.
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Amendment therefore limits the ability of the employer to condition
employment of that employee on the forfeiture of his or her constitutional
rights.259
Similarly, the interests that public employers have in sending and
advocating certain views and policies and maintaining the core values of
their institutions may be seen as more akin to Pickering efficiency interests
than a First Amendment right to expressive association.260 As the Ceballos
Court observed: "Supervisors must ensure that their employees' official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer's mission."261 In setting out the relevant interests, the Court
utilizes the language of efficiency interests, not of employer expressive
association rights. This is particularly telling, since Garcetti was decided
only about three months after Rumsfeld v. FAIR, and one would have
expected some comment about expressive association rights if the Court
had recognized the implications of its own statements in FAIR. Clearly,
however, the Court did not so understand its FAIR decision.
In any event, based on this governmental interests analysis, if a public
employer wishes not to hire a prospective employee because that employee
has engaged in controversial expression through the written word, like
Delahunty,262 or through non-traditional living arrangements, like Hobbs,263
the proper analysis is not to suggest that the government has a constitutional
right as an expressive association to disassociate itself from those individual
it deems promoting an antithetical message, but to determine whether the
constitutional rights of the individual cannot be recognized without
substantially disrupting the public employer's enterprise.264 Again, this
259

See id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). This
doctrine is commonly referred as the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, and figures prominently in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297,
1307 (2006) ("Under this principle, known as the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the Solomon Amendment would be unconstitutional if
Congress could not directly require universities to provide military
recruiters equal access to their students.").
260
See Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 ("Employers have heightened
interests in controlling speech made by an employee in his or her
professional capacity. Official communications have official consequences,
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity.").
261
Id. (emphasis added).
262
See infra Part IV.C.1.
263
See infra Part.IV.C.2.
264
I do not mean to suggest that the Pickering balance does not have its
own shortcomings. Its reliance on determining constitutional rights based
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analysis is more consistent with constitutional doctrine in the public
employer area and does not take the unprecedented step of suggesting that
government employers have First Amendment rights.
2. The Menace of the Government Speech Doctrine to Public
Employee First Amendment Rights
As much as Pickering provides a proper understanding of how public
employer interests to promote certain messages should be conceived, that is
to the degree to which the government speech doctrine has the ability to
wreak havoc on public employees' remaining constitutional rights in a large
sub-category of official capacity speech cases. Specifically, in coming to its
conclusion in Garcetti v. Ceballos that Ceballos did not have First
Amendment rights because he was acting in accordance with his job duties,
the Court commented that Ceballos' speech "owed its existence to [his]
professional responsibilities" and "simply reflects the exercise of employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created."265 In
making this point, the Court cites to the case of Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va.266 with a parenthetical that, "when government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is
entitled to say what it wishes."267 This language in turn was taken from
similar language in the abortion funding case of Rust v. Sullivan,268 which is
considered part of the Court's ever-expanding government speech
on whether a public employee's conduct causes his or her employer
substantial disruption is close to approaching the constitutionalization of the
heckler's veto. See Kozel, supra note 223, at 1018-19 ("Such a test is
inconsistent with the notion of robust exchange of divergent ideas, as it
leaves vulnerable the speech that is most likely to have a strong effect.").
265
See Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. However, Ceballos leaves open the
question of whether this holding should apply to public university
professors, like Delahunty, as the result of their enjoying some degree of
constitutionally protected academic freedom. See id. at 1962 ("There is
some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are
not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech
jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.").
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515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Id. at 833.
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doctrine.269
Under this doctrine, individuals can be compelled to subsidize
government speech without implicating any individual First Amendment
rights.270 The Court in Ceballos thus seems to be suggesting that
characterizing Ceballos' expression as government speech helps to explain
why he has no First Amendment rights when speaking in his official
capacity, whereas normally under the Connick/Pickering framework, he
would. Such a broad notion of public employee speech as government
speech, however, could all but wipe out a significant portion of public
employee First Amendment rights.271
Fortunately, it does not appear that the Court is willing to take the
government speech doctrine in the public employment context to that length
quite yet. Instead, the cite to the Rosenberger case in Ceballos was a "cf."
cite, suggesting that the "cited authority supports a proposition different
from the main proposition, but sufficiently analogous to lend support."272 In
other words, there is still room to doubt that the government speech doctrine
applies in its adulterated form to all public employee speech cases in which
there are statements made pursuant to official duties.
Justice Souter in his Ceballos dissent suggests ample reason why the
government speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering
doctrine. He notes that, "[s]ome public employees are hired to 'promote a
particular policy' by broadcasting a particular message set by the
government, but not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired
to speak from a government manifesto."273 Indeed, as Justice Souter points
269

See id. at 192-93 ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.'") (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)).
270
See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005)
("[I]t seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for
speech and other expression to advocate its own policies. We have
generally assumed…that compelled funding of government speech does not
alone raise First Amendment concerns.") (citing Board of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).
271
See Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The fallacy
of the majority's reliance on Rosenberger's understanding of Rust doctrine .
. . portends a bloated notion of controllable government speech going well
beyond the circumstances of this case.").
272
THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 46
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n at al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
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Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Legal
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out, there is no evidence that Ceballos himself was hired to "broadcast a
particular message set by the government," and instead, was hired "to
enforce the law by constitutional action."274 Similarly, returning to the
higher education context for a moment, no one would seriously argue that
public university professors are hired to send a particular government
message.275
In short, although even Justice Souter concedes that there may be some
public employees who are hired to advance specific governmental policies
and thus fall under the government speech doctrine, a large number of such
employees, including government lawyers, do not. Souter is right that "Rust
is no authority for the notion that the government may exercise plenary
control over every comment made by a public employee in doing his
job."276 Here's hoping that future Courts recognize Ceballos' error in this
regard and takes a mere "cf." cite for what it is.
CONCLUSION
Neither public law schools nor public employers have the constitutional
right to expressive association as Rumsfeld v. FAIR mistakenly suggests.
This inadvertent holding will eventually be rectified given the strong
constitutional structural arguments in opposition to such an interpretation.
But such a modification should be accompanied by a unifying theory about
how government efficiency concerns in maintaining core values and
promoting certain messages should be balanced against the First
Amendment rights of public employees to engage in protected
constitutional activities. In some cases then public employers will be
permitted to adhere to core values and promote certain messages as a part of
their Pickering efficiency interests in running their organizations as they see
fit. Even so, these efficiency interests in the last analysis must be balanced
against employee constitutional rights and do not simply override such
interests. Furthermore, the government speech doctrine should not be read
expansively into the public employment context to strip public employees
Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)).
274
Id.
275
See id. ("This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First
Amendment is spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public
university professor…."). The majority grants that different considerations
might apply when the academic freedom concerns of professors engaged in
teaching and scholarship are involved, but does not decide that issue since
Ceballos itself does not concern academic freedom. See id. at 1962.
276
Id. at 1969.
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of constitutional right when they are acting pursuant to their official duties.
Instead, that doctrine should be limited to instances where a public
employee has been hired to actually promote a specific governmental
message.
In the end, only in this way will an unprecedented aggrandizement of
constitutional power by public employers, to the detriment of public
employees' constitutional and civil rights, be avoided.

